Complete Home & Office Legal Guide/Complete Home and Office Legal Guide (Chestnut) (1993).ISO/stat/ussct/abort4.asc

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Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

 The portions of the Court's opinion that I have joined
are more important than those with which I disagree.  I shall
therefore first comment on significant areas of agreement, and
then explain the limited character of my disagreement.

I

 The Court is unquestionably correct in concluding that
the doctrine of stare decisis has controlling significance in a
case of this kind, notwithstanding an individual justice's
concerns about the merits.  The central holding of Roe v. Wade,
410 U. S. 113 (1973), has been a part of our law for almost two
decades.  Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.
S. 52, 101 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).  It was a natural sequel to the protection of
individual liberty established in Griswold v.  Connecticut, 381
U. S. 479 (1965).  See also Carey v.  Population Services Int'l,
431 U. S. 678, 687, 702 (1977) (White, J., concurring in part and
concurring in result).  The societal costs of overruling Roe at
this late date would be enormous.  Roe is an integral part of a
correct understanding of both the concept of liberty and the
basic equality of men and women.

 Stare decisis also provides a sufficient basis for my
agreement with the joint opinion's reaffirmation of Roe's
post-viability analysis.  Specifically, I accept the proposition
that [i]f the State is interested in protecting fetal life after
viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that
period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or
health of the mother.  410 U. S., at 163-164; see ante, at 36-37.

 I also accept what is implicit in the Court's analysis,
namely, a reaffirmation of Roe's explanation of why the State's
obligation to protect the life or health of the mother must take
precedence over any duty to the unborn.  The Court in Roe
carefully considered, and rejected, the State's argument that the
fetus is a `person' within the language and meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment.  410 U. S., at 156.  After analyzing the
usage of person in the Constitution, the Court concluded that
that word has application only postnatally.  Id., at 157.
Commenting on the contingent property interests of the unborn
that are generally represented by guardians ad litem, the Court
noted:  Perfection of the interests involved, again, has
generally been contingent upon live birth.  In short, the unborn
have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole
sense.  Id., at 162.  Accordingly, an abortion is not the
termination of life entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection.
Id., at 159.  From this holding, there was no dissent, see id.,
at 173; indeed, no member of the Court has ever questioned this
fundamental proposition.  Thus, as a matter of federal
constitutional law, a developing organism that is not yet a
person does not have what is sometimes described as a right to
life.  This has been and, by the Court's holding today, remains a

fundamental premise of our constitutional law governing
reproductive autonomy.

II

 My disagreement with the joint opinion begins with its
understanding of the trimester framework established in Roe.
Contrary to the suggestion of the joint opinion, ante, at 33, it
is not a contradiction to recognize that the State may have a
legitimate interest in potential human life and, at the same
time, to conclude that that interest does not justify the
regulation of abortion before viability (although other
interests, such as maternal health, may).  The fact that the
State's interest is legitimate does not tell us when, if ever,
that interest outweighs the pregnant woman's interest in personal
liberty.  It is appropriate, therefore, to consider more
carefully the nature of the interests at stake.

 First, it is clear that, in order to be legitimate, the
State's interest must be secular; consistent with the First
Amendment the State may not promote a theological or sectarian
interest.  See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists, 476 U. S. 747, 778 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); see generally Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, 492 U. S. 490, 563-572 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).  Moreover, as discussed above,
the state interest in potential human life is not an interest in
loco parentis, for the fetus is not a person.

 Identifying the State's interests "which the States
rarely articulate with any precision "makes clear that the
interest in protecting potential life is not grounded in the
Constitution.  It is, instead, an indirect interest supported by
both humanitarian and pragmatic concerns.  Many of our citizens
believe that any abortion reflects an unacceptable disrespect for
potential human life and that the performance of more than a
million abortions each year is intolerable; many find
third-trimester abortions performed when the fetus is approaching
personhood particularly offensive.  The State has a legitimate
interest in minimizing such offense.  The State may also have a
broader interest in expanding the population, believing society
would benefit from the services of additional productive citizens
"or that the potential human lives might include the occasional
Mozart or Curie."  These are the kinds of concerns that comprise
the State's interest in potential human life.

 In counterpoise is the woman's constitutional interest in
liberty.  One aspect of this liberty is a right to bodily
integrity, a right to control one's person.  See e.g., Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S.
535 (1942).  This right is neutral on the question of abortion:
The Constitution would be equally offended by an absolute
requirement that all women undergo abortions as by an absolute
prohi- bition on abortions.  Our whole constitutional heritage
rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control
men's minds.  Stanley v.  Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 565 (1969).
The same holds true for the power to control women's bodies.

/* Stanley vs. Georgia being the case in which the Supreme Court
held that the private possession of obscene material (other than
child pronography) by adults in the privacy of their homes, is
legal. */


 The woman's constitutional liberty interest also involves
her freedom to decide matters of the highest privacy and the most
personal nature.  Cf.  Whalen v. Roe, 409 U. S. 589, 598-600
(1977).  A woman considering abortion faces a difficult choice
having serious and personal consequences of major importance to
her own future "perhaps to the salvation of her own immortal
soul."  Thornburgh, 476 U. S., at 781.  The authority to make
such traumatic and yet empowering decisions is an element of
basic human dignity.  As the joint opinion so eloquently
demonstrates, a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy is
nothing less than a matter of conscience.

 Weighing the State's interest in potential life and the
woman's liberty interest, I agree with the joint opinion that the
State may `expres[s] a preference for normal childbirth,' that
the State may take steps to ensure that a woman's choice is
thoughtful and informed, and that States are free to enact laws
to provide a reasonable framework for a woman to make a decision
that has such profound and lasting meaning.  Ante, at 30.
Serious questions arise, however, when a State attempts to
persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.  Ante, at
36.  Decisional autonomy must limit the State's power to inject
into a woman's most personal deliberations its own views of what
is best.  The State may promote its preferences by funding
childbirth, by creating and maintaining alternatives to abortion,
and by espousing the virtues of family; but it must respect the
individual's freedom to make such judgments.

 This theme runs throughout our decisions concerning
reproductive freedom.  In general, Roe's requirement that
restrictions on abortions before viability be justified by the
State's interest in maternal health has prevented States from
interjecting regulations designed to influence a woman's
decision.  Thus, we have upheld regulations of abortion that are
not efforts to sway or direct a woman's choice but rather are
efforts to enhance the deliberative quality of that decision or
are neutral regulations on the health aspects of her decision.
We have, for example, upheld regulations requiring written
informed consent, see Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976); limited recordkeeping and
reporting, see ibid.; and pathology reports, see Planned
Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U. S.
476 (1983); as well as various licensing and qualification
provisions, see e.g., Roe, 410 U. S., at 150; Simopoulos v.
Virginia, 462 U. S. 506 (1983).  Conversely, we have consistently
rejected state efforts to prejudice a woman's choice, either by
limiting the information available to her, see Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U. S. 809 (1975), or by requir[ing] the delivery of
information designed `to influence the woman's informed choice
between abortion or childbirth.' Thornburgh, 476 U. S., at 760;
see also Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462
U. S. 416, 442-449 (1983).

 In my opinion, the principles established in this long
line of cases and the wisdom reflected in Justice Powell's
opinion for the Court in Akron (and followed by the Court just
six years ago in Thornburgh) should govern our decision today.
Under these principles, 3205(a)(2)(i)-(iii) of the Pennsylvania
statute are unconstitutional.  Those sections require a physician
or counselor to provide the woman with a range of materials
clearly designed to persuade her to choose not to undergo the
abortion.  While the State is free, pursuant to 3208 of the
Pennsylvania law, to produce and disseminate such material, the
State may not inject such information into the woman's
deliberations just as she is weighing such an important choice.

 Under this same analysis, 3205(a)(1)(i) and (iii) of the
Pennsylvania statute are constitutional.  Those sections, which
require the physician to inform a woman of the nature and risks
of the abortion procedure and the medical risks of carrying to
term, are neutral requirements comparable to those imposed in
other medical procedures.  Those sections indicate no effort by
the State to influence the woman's choice in any way.  If
anything, such requirements enhance, rather than skew, the
woman's decisionmaking.

III

 The 24-hour waiting period required by 3205- (a)(1)-(2)
of the Pennsylvania statute raises even more serious concerns.
Such a requirement arguably furthers the State's interests in two
ways, neither of which is constitutionally permissible.

 First, it may be argued that the 24-hour delay is
justified by the mere fact that it is likely to reduce the number
of abortions, thus furthering the State's interest in potential
life.  But such an argument would justify any form of coercion
that placed an obstacle in the woman's path.  The State cannot
further its interests by simply wearing down the ability of the
pregnant woman to exercise her constitutional right.

 Second, it can more reasonably be argued that the 24-hour
delay furthers the State's interest in ensuring that the woman's
decision is informed and thoughtful.  But there is no evidence
that the mandated delay benefits women or that it is necessary to
enable the physician to convey any relevant information to the
patient.  The mandatory delay thus appears to rest on outmoded
and unacceptable assumptions about the decisionmaking capacity of
women.  While there are wellestablished and consistently
maintained reasons for the State to view with skepticism the
ability of minors to make decisions, see Hodgson v. Minnesota,
497 U. S. 417, 449 (1990), none of those reasons applies to an
adult woman's decisionmaking ability.  Just as we have left
behind the belief that a woman must consult her husband before
undertaking serious matters, see ante, at 54-57, so we must
reject the notion that a woman is less capable of deciding
matters of gravity.  Cf. Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (1971).

/* The Court here noting the insulting and condescending aspects
of regulations designed to protect women from themselves. */


 In the alternative, the delay requirement may be premised
on the belief that the decision to terminate a pregnancy is
presumptively wrong.  This premise is illegitimate.  Those who
disagree vehemently about the legality and morality of abortion
agree about one thing: The decision to terminate a pregnancy is
profound and difficult.  No person undertakes such a decision
lightly"and States may not presume that a woman has failed to
reflect adequately merely because her conclusion differs from the
State's preference.  A woman who has, in the privacy of her
thoughts and conscience, weighed the options and made her
decision cannot be forced to reconsider all, simply because the
State believes she has come to the wrong conclusion.

 Part of the constitutional liberty to choose is the equal
dignity to which each of us is entitled.  A woman who decides to
terminate her pregnancy is entitled to the same respect as a
woman who decides to carry the fetus to term.  The mandatory
waiting period denies women that equal respect.


IV

 In my opinion, a correct application of the undue burden
standard leads to the same conclusion concerning the
constitutionality of these requirements.  A state-imposed burden
on the exercise of a constitutional right is measured both by its
effects and by its character: A burden may be undue either
because the burden is too severe or because it lacks a
legitimate, rational justification.

 The 24-hour delay requirement fails both parts of this
test.  The findings of the District Court establish the severity
of the burden that the 24-hour delay imposes on many pregnant
women.  Yet even in those cases in which the delay is not
especially onerous, it is, in my opinion, undue because there is
no evidence that such a delay serves a useful and legitimate
purpose.  As indicated above, there is no legitimate reason to
require a woman who has agonized over her decision to leave the
clinic or hospital and return again another day.  While a general
requirement that a physician notify her patients about the risks
of a proposed medical procedure is appropriate, a rigid
requirement that all patients wait 24 hours or (what is true in
practice) much longer to evaluate the significance of information
that is either common knowledge or irrelevant is an irrational
and, therefore, undue burden.

 The counseling provisions are similarly infirm.  Whenever
government commands private citizens to speak or to listen,
careful review of the justification for that command is
particularly appropriate.  In this case, the Pennsylvania statute
directs that counselors provide women seeking abortions with
information concerning alternatives to abortion, the availability
of medical assistance benefits, and the possibility of child-
support payments.  3205(a)(2)(i)-(iii).  The statute requires
that this information be given to all women seeking abortions,
including those for whom such information is clearly useless,
such as those who are married, those who have undergone the
procedure in the past and are fully aware of the options, and
those who are fully convinced that abortion is their only
reasonable option.  Moreover, the statute requires physicians to
inform all of their patients of the probable gestational age of
the unborn child.  3205(a)(1)(ii).  This information is of little
decisional value in most cases, because 90% of all abortions are
performed during the first trimester when fetal age has less
relevance than when the fetus nears viability.  Nor can the
information required by the statute be justified as relevant to
any philosophic or social argument, ante, at 30, either favoring
or disfavoring the abortion decision in a particular case.  In
light of all of these facts, I conclude that the information
requirements in 3205(a)(1)(ii) and 3205(a)(2)(i)-(iii) do not
serve a useful purpose and thus constitute an unnecessary "and
therefore undue" burden on the woman's constitutional liberty to
decide to terminate her pregnancy.

 Accordingly, while I disagree with Parts IV, V-B, and V-D
of the joint opinion, I join the remainder of the Court's
opinion.

 Justice Blackmun, concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part.

 I join parts I, II, III, V-A, V-C, and VI of the joint
opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, ante.

 Three years ago, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv.,
492 U. S. 490 (1989), four Members of this Court appeared poised
to cas[t] into darkness the hopes and visions of every woman in
this country who had come to believe that the Constitution
guaranteed her the right to reproductive choice.  Id., at 557
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).  See id., at 499 (opinion of
Rehnquist, C.J.); id., at 532 (opinion of Scalia, J.).  All that
remained between the promise of Roe and the darkness of the
plurality was a single, flickering flame.  Decisions since
Webster gave little reason to hope that this flame would cast
much light.  See, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, 497 U. S. 502, 524 (1990) (opinion of Blackmun, J.).  But
now, just when so many expected the darkness to fall, the flame
has grown bright.

 I do not underestimate the significance of today's joint
opinion.  Yet I remain steadfast in my belief that the right to
reproductive choice is entitled to the full protection afforded
by this Court before Webster.  And I fear for the darkness as
four Justices anxiously await the single vote necessary to
extinguish the light.

I

 Make no mistake, the joint opinion of Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter is an act of personal courage and
constitutional principle.  In contrast to previous decisions in
which Justices O'Connor and Kennedy postponed reconsideration
of Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), the authors of the joint
opinion today join Justice Stevens and me in concluding that the
essential holding of Roe should be retained and once again
reaffirmed.  Ante, at 3.  In brief, five Members of this Court
today recognize that the Constitution protects a woman's right to
terminate her pregnancy in its early stages.  Id., at 1.

 A fervent view of individual liberty and the force of
stare decisis have led the Court to this conclusion.  Ante, at
11.  Today a majority reaffirms that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a realm of personal liberty
which the government may not enter, ante, at 5 "a realm whose
outer limits cannot be determined by interpretations of the
Constitution that focus only on the specific practices of States
at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.  See ante, at
6.  Included within this realm of liberty is `the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.'" Ante,
at 9, quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 453 (1972)
(emphasis in original).  These matters, involving the most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to
the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Ante, at 9
(emphasis added).  Finally, the Court today recognizes that in
the case of abortion, the liberty of the woman is at stake in a
sense unique to the human condition and so unique to the law.
The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to
anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she must
bear.  Ante, at 10.

 The Court's reaffirmation of Roe's central holding is
also based on the force of stare decisis.  [N]o erosion of
principle going to liberty or personal autonomy has left Roe's
central holding a doctrinal remnant; Roe portends no developments
at odds with other precedent for the analysis of personal
liberty; and no changes of fact have rendered viability more or
less appropriate as the point at which the balance of interests
tips.  Ante, at 18.  Indeed, the Court acknowledges that Roe's
limitation on state power could not be removed without serious
inequity to those who have relied upon it or significant damage
to the stability of the society governed by the rule in question.
Ante, at 13.  In the 19 years since Roe was decided, that case
has shaped more than reproductive planning" an entire generation
has come of age free to assume Roe's concept of liberty in
defining the capacity of women to act in society and to make
reproductive decisions.  Ante, at 18.  The Court understands
that, having call[ed] the contending sides . . . to end their
national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the
Constitution, ante, at 24, a decision to overrule Roe would
seriously weaken the Court's capacity to exercise the judicial
power and to function as the Supreme Court of a Nation dedicated
to the rule of law.  Ante, at 22.  What has happened today should
serve as a model for future Justices and a warning to all who
have tried to turn this Court into yet another political branch.

 In striking down the Pennsylvania statute's spousal
notification requirement, the Court has established a framework
for evaluating abortion regulations that responds to the social
context of women facing issues of reproductive choice.  In
determining the burden imposed by the challenged regulation, the
Court inquires whether the regulation's purpose or effect is to
place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion before the fetus attains viability.  Ante, at 35
(emphasis added).  The Court reaffirms:  The proper focus of
constitu- tional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a
restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant.  Ante,
at 53-54.  Looking at this group, the Court inquires, based on
expert testimony, empirical studies, and common sense, whether in
a large fraction of the cases in which [the restriction] is
relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's
choice to undergo an abortion.  Id., at 54.  A statute with this
purpose is invalid because the means chosen by the State to
further the interest in potential life must be calculated to
inform the woman's free choice, not hinder it.  Ante, at 35.  And
in applying its test, the Court remains sensitive to the unique
role of women in the decision-making process.  Whatever may have
been the practice when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, the
Court observes, [w]omen do not lose their constitutionally
protected liberty when they marry.  The Constitution protects all
individuals, male or female, married or unmarried, from the abuse
of governmental power, even where that power is employed for the
supposed benefit of a member of the individual's family.  Ante,
at 57-58.

 Lastly, while I believe that the joint opinion errs in
failing to invalidate the other regulations, I am pleased that
the joint opinion has not ruled out the possibility that these
regulations may be shown to impose an unconstitutional burden.
The joint opinion makes clear that its specific holdings are
based on the insufficiency of the record before it.  See, e.g.,
id., at 43.  I am confident that in the future evidence will be
produced to show that in a large fraction of the cases in which
[these regulations are] relevant, [they] will operate as a
substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an abortion.
Ante, at 54.
/* An invitation for the court to later reconsider these matters.
*/

II


 Today, no less than yesterday, the Constitution and
decisions of this Court require that a State's abortion
restrictions be subjected to the strictest of judicial scrutiny.
Our precedents and the joint opinion's principles require us to
subject all non-de minimis abortion regulations to strict
scrutiny.  Under this standard, the Pennsylvania statute's
provisions requiring content-based counseling, a 24-hour delay,
informed parental consent, and reporting of abortion-related
information must be invalidated.

A

 The Court today reaffirms the long recognized rights of
privacy and bodily integrity.  As early as 1891, the Court held,
[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by
the commonlaw, than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint
or interference of others . . . .  Union Pacific R. Co. v.
Botsford, 141 U. S. 250, 251 (1891).  Throughout this century,
this Court also has held that the fundamental right of privacy
protects citizens against governmental intrusion in such intimate
family matters as procreation, childrearing, marriage, and
contraceptive choice.  See ante, at 5-6.  These cases embody the
principle that personal decisions that profoundly affect bodily
integrity, identity, and destiny should be largely beyond the
reach of government.  Eisenstadt, 405 U.S., at 453.  In Roe v.
Wade, this Court correctly applied these principles to a woman's
right to choose abortion.

 State restrictions on abortion violate a woman's right of
privacy in two ways.  First, compelled continuation of a
pregnancy infringes upon a woman's right to bodily integrity by
imposing substantial physical intrusions and significant risks of
physical harm.  During pregnancy, women experience dramatic
physical changes and a wide range of health consequences.  Labor
and delivery pose additional health risks and physical demands.
In short, restrictive abortion laws force women to endure
physical invasions far more substantial than those this Court has
held to violate the constitutional principle of bodily integrity
in other contexts.  See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S.  753
(1985) (invalidating surgical removal of bullet from murder
suspect); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.  165 (1952)
(invalidating stomach-pumping).

 Further, when the State restricts a woman's right to
terminate her pregnancy, it deprives a woman of the right to make
her own decision about reproduction and family planning "critical
life choices" that this Court long has deemed central to the
right to privacy.  The decision to terminate or continue a
pregnancy has no less an impact on a woman's life than decisions
about contraception or marriage.  410 U.S., at 153.  Because
motherhood has a dramatic impact on a woman's educational
prospects, employment opportunities, and self- determination,
restrictive abortion laws deprive her of basic control over her
life.  For these reasons, the decision whether or not to beget or
bear a child lies at the very heart of this cluster of
constitutionally protected choices.  Carey v. Population
Services, Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).

 A State's restrictions on a woman's right to terminate
her pregnancy also implicate constitutional guarantees of gender
equality.  State restrictions on abortion compel women to
continue pregnancies they otherwise might terminate.  By
restricting the right to terminate pregnancies, the State
conscripts women's bodies into its service, forcing women to
continue their pregnancies, suffer the pains of childbirth, and
in most instances, provide years of maternal care.  The State
does not compensate women for their services; instead, it assumes
that they owe this duty as a matter of course.  This assumption
"that women can simply be forced to accept the natural status and
incidents of motherhood" appears to rest upon a conception of
women's role that has triggered the protection of the Equal
Protection Clause.  See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U. S. 718, 724-726 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S.
190, 198-199 (1976).  The joint opinion recognizes that these
assumptions about women's place in society are no longer
consistent with our understanding of the family, the individual,
or the Constitution.  Ante, at 55.

B

 The Court has held that limitations on the right of
privacy are permissible only if they survive strict
constitutional scrutiny "that is, only if the governmental entity
imposing the restriction can demonstrate that the limitation is
both necessary and narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest."  Griswold v.  Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485 (1965).  We have applied this principle specifically in the
context of abortion regulations.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 155.

 Roe implemented these principles through a framework that
was designed to insure that the woman's right to choose not
become so subordinate to the State's interest in promoting fetal
life that her choice exists in theory but not in fact, ante, at
30.  Roe identified two relevant State interests:  an interest in
preserving and pro- tecting the health of the pregnant woman and
an interest in protecting the potentiality of human life.  410 U.
S., at 162.  With respect to the State's interest in the health
of the mother, the `compelling' point . . . is at approximately
the end of the first trimester, because it is at that point that
the mortality rate in abortion approaches that in childbirth.
Roe, 410 U. S., at 163.  With respect to the State's interest in
potential life, the `compelling' point is at viability, because
it is at that point that the fetus presumably has the capability
of meaningful life outside the mother's womb.  Ibid.  In order to
fulfill the requirement of narrow tailoring, the State is
obligated to make a reasonable effort to limit the effect of its
regulations to the period in the trimester during which its
health interest will be furthered.  Akron, 462 U. S., at 434.

 In my view, application of this analytical frame- work is
no less warranted than when it was approved by seven Members of
this Court in Roe.  Strict scrutiny of state limitations on
reproductive choice still offers the most secure protection of
the woman's right to make her own reproductive decisions, free
from state coercion.  No majority of this Court has ever agreed
upon an alternative approach.  The factual premises of the
trimester framework have not been undermined, see Webster, 492
U.S., at 553 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), and the Roe framework is
far more administrable, and far less manipulable, than the undue
burden standard adopted by the joint opinion.

 Nonetheless, three criticisms of the trimester framework
continue to be uttered.  First, the trimester framework is
attacked because its key elements do not appear in the text of
the Consti tution.  My response to this attack remains the same
as it was in Webster:

 Were this a true concern, we would have to abandon most
of our constitutional jurispru- dence.  [T]he `critical elements'
of countless constitutional doctrines nowhere appear in
the Constitution's text . . . .  The Constitution makes no
mention, for example, of the First Amendment's `actual malice'
standard for proving certain libels, see New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). . . .

Similarly, the Constitution makes no mention of the
rational-basis test, or the specific verbal formulations of
intermediate and strict scrutiny by which this Court evaluates
claims under the Equal Protection Clause.  The reason is simple.
Like the Roe framework, these tests or standards are not, and do
not purport to be, rights protected by the Constitution.  Rather,
they are judge-made methods for evaluating and measuring the
strength and scope of constitutional rights or for balancing the
constitutional rights of individuals against the competing
interests of government.  492 U.S., at 548.


 The second criticism is that the framework more closely
resembles a regulatory code than a body of constitutional
doctrine.  Again, my answer remains the same as in Webster.

 [I]f this were a true and genuine concern, we would have
to abandon vast areas of our constitutional jurisprudence. . . .
Are [the distinctions entailed in the trimester framework] any
finer, or more `regulatory,' than the distinctions we have often
drawn in our First Amendment jurisprudence, where, for example,
we have held that a `release time' program permitting
public-school students to leave school grounds during school
hours receive religious instruction does not violate the
Establishment Clause, even though a release- time program
permitting religious instruction on school grounds does violate
the Clause?  Compare Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), with
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education of School Dist.
No. 71, Champaign County, 333 U.S. 203 (1948). . . .  Similarly,
in a Sixth Amendment case, the Court held that although an
overnight ban on attorney-client communication violated the
constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel, Geders v. United
States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976), that right was not violated when a
trial judge separated a defendant from his lawyer during a
15-minute recess after the defendant's direct testimony.  Perry
v. Leake, 488 U.S. 272 (1989).  That numerous constitutional
doctrines result in narrow differentiations between similar
circumstances does not mean that this Court has aban- doned
adjudication in favor of regulation.  Id., at 549-550.

 The final, and more genuine, criticism of the trimester
framework is that it fails to find the State's interest in
potential human life compelling throughout pregnancy.  No member
of this Court "nor for that matter, the Solicitor General, Tr. of
Oral Arg. 42" has ever questioned our holding in Roe that an
abortion is not the termination of life entitled to Fourteenth
Amendment protection.  410 U.S., at 159.  Accordingly, a State's
interest in protecting fetal life is not grounded in the
Constitution.  Nor, consistent with our Establishment Clause, can
it be a theological or sectarian interest.  See Thornburgh, 476
U.S., at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring).  It is, instead, a
legitimate interest grounded in humanitarian or pragmatic
concerns.  See ante, at 4-5 (opinion of Stevens, J.).

 But while a State has legitimate interests from the
outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and
the life of the fetus that may become a child, ante, at 4,
legitimate interests are not enough.  To overcome the burden of
strict scrutiny, the interests must be compelling.  The question
then is how best to accommodate the State's interest in potential
human life with the constitutional liberties of pregnant women.
Again, I stand by the views I expressed in Webster:  I remain
convinced, as six other Members of this Court 16 years ago were
convinced, that the Roe framework, and the viability standard in
particular, fairly, sensibly, and effectively functions to
safeguard the constitutional liberties of pregnant women while
recognizing and accommodating the State's interest in potential
human life.  The viability line reflects the biological facts and
truths of fetal development; it marks that threshold moment prior
to which a fetus cannot survive separate from the woman and
cannot reasonably and objectively be regarded as a subject of
rights or interests distinct from, or paramount to, those of the
pregnant woman.  At the same time, the viability standard takes
account of the undeniable fact that as the fetus evolves into its
postnatal form, and as it loses its dependence on the uterine
environment, the State's interest in the fetus' potential human
life, and in fostering a regard for human life in general,
becomes compelling.  As a practical matter, because viability
follows `quickening'"the point at which a woman feels movement in
her womb"and because viability occurs no earlier than 23 weeks
gestational age, it establishes an easily applicable standard for
regulating abortion while providing a pregnant woman ample time
to exercise her fundamental right with her responsible physician
to terminate her pregnancy.  492 U.S., at 553-554.

 Roe's trimester framework does not ignore the State's
interest in prenatal life.  Like Justice Stevens, I agree that
the State may take steps to ensure that a woman's choice is
thoughtful and informed, ante, at 29, and that States are free to
enact laws to provide a reasonable frame- work for a woman to
make a decision that has such profound and lasting meaning.
Ante, at 30.  But [s]erious questions arise when a State attempts
to `persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.' Ante,
at 36.  Deci sional autonomy must limit the State's power to
inject into a woman's most personal deliberations its own views
of what is best.  The State may promote its preferences by
funding childbirth, by creating and maintaining alternatives to
abortion, and by espousing the virtues of family, but it must
respect the individual's freedom to make such judgments.  Ante,
at 6 (opinion of Stevens, J.). As the joint opinion recognizes,
the means chosen by the State to further the interest in
potential life must be calculated to inform the woman's free
choice, not hinder it.  Ante, at 35.

 In sum, Roe's requirement of strict scrutiny as
implemented through a trimester framework should not be
disturbed.  No other approach has gained a majority, and no other
is more protective of the woman's fundamental right.  Lastly, no
other approach properly accommodates the woman's constitutional
right with the State's legitimate interests.

C

 Application of the strict scrutiny standard results in
the invalidation of all the challenged provisions.  Indeed, as
this Court has invalidated virtually identical provisions in
prior cases, stare decisis requires that we again strike them
down.

 This Court has upheld informed and written consent
requirements only where the State has demonstrated that they
genuinely further important health-related state concerns.  See
Danforth, 428 U. S., at 65-67.  A State may not, under the guise
of securing informed consent, require the delivery of information
`designed to influence the woman's informed choice between
abortion or childbirth.' Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U. S. 747, 760 (1986),
(quoting Akron, 462 U. S., at 443-444).  Rigid requirements that
a specific body of information be imparted to a woman in all
cases, regardless of the needs of the patient, improperly intrude
upon the discre- tion of the pregnant woman's physician and
thereby impose an `undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket.'
Thornburgh, 476 U. S., at 762 (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S., at 67,
n. 8).

 Measured against these principles, some aspects of the
Pennsylvania informed-consent scheme are unconstitutional.  While
it is unobjectionable for the Commonwealth to require that the
patient be informed of the nature of the procedure, the health
risks of the abortion and of childbirth, and the probable
gestational age of the unborn child, compare 3205(a)(i)-(iii)
with Akron, 462 U. S., at 446, n.  37, I remain unconvinced that
there is a vital state need for insisting that the information be
provided by a physician rather than a counselor.  Id., at 448.
The District Court found that the physician-only requirement
necessarily would increase costs to the plaintiff-clinics, costs
that undoubtedly would be passed on to patients.  And because
trained women counselors are often more understanding than
physicians, and generally have more time to spend with patients,
see App.  366a-387a, the physician-only disclosure requirement is
not narrowly tailored to serve the Commonwealth's interest in
protecting maternal health.

 Sections 3205(a)(2)(i)-(iii) of the Act further requires
that the physician or a qualified non- physician inform the woman
that printed materials are available from the Commonwealth that
describe the fetus and provide information about medical
assistance for childbirth, information about child support from
the father, and a list of agencies offering that provide adoption
and other services as alternatives to abortion.  Thornburgh
invalidated biased patient-counseling requirements virtually
identical to the one at issue here.  What we said of those
requirements fully applies in this case:

 the listing of agencies in the printed Pennsylvania form
presents serious problems; it contains names of agencies that
well may be out of step with the needs of the particular woman
and thus places the physician in an awkward position and
infringes upon his or her professional responsibilities.  Forcing
the physician or counselor to present the materials and the list
to the woman makes him or her in effect an agent of the State in
treating the woman and places his or her imprimatur upon
both the materials and the list.  All this is, or comes close to
being, state medicine imposed upon the woman, not the
professional medical guidance she seeks, and it officially
structures "as it obviously was intended to do" the dialogue
between the woman and her physician.

 The requirements . . . that the woman be advised that
medical assistance benefits may be available, and that the father
is responsible for financial assistance in the support of the
child similarly are poorly disguised elements of discouragement
for the abortion decision.  Much of this . . ., for many
patients, would be irrelevant and inappropriate.  For a patient
with a life-threatening pregnancy, the `information' in its very
rendition may be cruel as well as destructive of the
physician-patient relationship.  As any experienced social worker
or other counselor knows, theoretical financial responsibility
often does not equate with fulfillment . . . .  Under the guise
of informed consent, the Act requires the dissemination of
information that is not relevant to such consent, and, thus, it
advances no legitimate state interest.  476 U. S., at 763.

 This type of compelled information is the antithesis of
informed consent, id., at 764, and goes far beyond merely
describing the general subject matter relevant to the woman's
decision.

 That the Commonwealth does not, and surely would not,
compel similar disclosure of every possible peril of necessary
surgery or of simple vaccination, reveals the anti-abortion
character of the statute and its real purpose.  Ibid.

 The 24-hour waiting period following the provision of the
foregoing information is also clearly unconstitutional.  The
District Court found that the mandatory 24-hour delay could lead
to delays in excess of 24 hours, thus increasing health risks,
and that it would require two visits to the abortion provider,
thereby increasing travel time, exposure to further harassment,
and financial cost.

 Finally, the District Court found that the requirement
would pose especially significant burdens on women living in
rural areas and those women that have difficulty explaining their
whereabouts.  App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 91-902, pp.
380a-382a (hereinafter App.).  In Akron this Court invalidated a
similarly arbitrary or inflexible waiting period because, as
here, it furthered no legitimate state interest.

 As Justice Stevens insightfully concludes, the mandatory
delay rests either on outmoded or unacceptable assumptions about
the decisionmaking capacity of women or the belief that the
decision to terminate the pregnancy is presumptively wrong.
Ante, at 8.  The requirement that women consider this obvious and
slanted information for an additional 24 hours contained in these
provisions will only influence the woman's decision in improper
ways.  The vast majority of women will know this information "of
the few that do not, it is less likely that their minds will be
changed by this information than it will be either by the
realization that the State opposes their choice or the need once
again to endure abuse and harassment on return to the clinic."

 Except in the case of a medical emergency, 3206 requires
a physician to obtain the informed consent of a parent or
guardian before performing an abortion on an unemancipated minor
or an incompetent woman.  Based on evidence in the record, the
District Court concluded that, in order to fulfill the
informed-consent requirement, generally accepted medical
principles would require an in-person visit by the parent to the
facility.  App. 399a.  Although the Court has recognized that the
State has somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities
of children than of adults, the State nevertheless must
demonstrate that there is a significant state interest in
conditioning an abortion . . . that is not present in the case of
an adult.  Danforth, 428 U. S., at 74-75 (emphasis added).  The
requirement of an in-person visit would carry with it the risk of
a delay of several days or possibly weeks, even where the parent
is willing to consent.  While the State has an interest in
encouraging parental involvement in the minor's abortion
decision, 3206 is not narrowly drawn to serve that interest.

 Finally, the Pennsylvania statute requires every facility
performing abortions to report its activities to the
Commonwealth.  Pennsylvania contends that this requirement is
valid under Danforth, in which this Court held that recordkeeping
and reporting requirements that are reasonably directed to the
preservation of maternal health and that properly respect a
patient's confidentiality are permissible.  428 U. S., at
79-81. The Commonwealth attempts to justify its required reports
on the ground that the public has a right to know how its tax
dollars are spent.  A regulation designed to inform the public
about public expenditures does not further the Commonwealth's
interest in protecting maternal health.  Accordingly, such a
regulation cannot justify a legally significant burden on a
woman's right to obtain an abortion.

 The confidential reports concerning the identities and
medical judgment of physicians involved in abortions at first
glance may seem valid, given the State's interest in maternal
health and enforcement of the Act.  The District Court found,
however, that, notwithstanding the confidentiality protections,
many physicians, particularly those who have previously
discontinued performing abortions because of harassment, would
refuse to refer patients to abortion clinics if their names were
to appear on these reports.  App.  447a-448a. The Commonwealth
has failed to show that the name of the referring physician
either adds to the pool of scientific knowledge concerning
abortion or is reasonably related to the Commonwealth's interest
in maternal health.  I therefore agree with the District Court's
conclusion that the confidential reporting requirements are
unconstitutional insofar as they require the name of the
referring physician and the basis for his or her medical
judgment.

 In sum, I would affirm the judgment in No. 91-902 and
reverse the judgment in No. 91-744 and remand the cases for
further proceedings.

III

 At long last, The Chief Justice admits it.  Gone are the
contentions that the issue need not be (or has not been)
considered.  There, on the first page, for all to see, is what
was expected:  We believe that Roe was wrongly decided, and that
it can and should be overruled consistently with our traditional
approach to stare decisis in constitutional cases.  Post, at 1.
If there is much reason to applaud the advances made by the joint
opinion today, there is far more to fear from The Chief Justice's
opinion.

 The Chief Justice's criticism of Roe follows from his
stunted conception of individual liberty.  While recognizing that
the Due Process Clause protects more than simple physical
liberty, he then goes on to construe this Court's personal
liberty cases as establishing only a laundry list of particular
rights, rather than a principled account of how these particular
rights are grounded in a more general right of privacy.  Post, at
9.  This constricted view is reinforced by The Chief Justice's
exclusive reliance on tradition as a source of fundamental
rights.  He argues that the record in favor of a right to
abortion is no stronger than the record in Michael H. v. Gerald
D., 491 U. S. 110 (1989), where the plurality found no
fundamental right to visitation privileges by an adulterous
father, or in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), where the
Court found no fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy,
or in a case involving the firing of a gun . . . into another
person's body.  Post, at 9-10.  In The Chief Justice's world, a
woman considering whether to terminate a pregnancy is entitled to
no more protection than adulterers, murderers, and so- called
sexual deviates.  Given The Chief Justice's exclusive reliance on
tradition, people using contraceptives seem the next likely candi
date for his list of outcasts. Even more shocking than The Chief
Justice's cramped notion of individual liberty is his complete
omission of any discussion of the effects that compelled
childbirth and motherhood have on women's lives.  The only
expression of concern with women's health is purely instrumental
"for The Chief Justice, only women's psychological health is a
concern, and only to the extent that he assumes that every woman
who decides to have an abortion does so without serious
consideration of the moral implications of their decision."
Post, at 25-26. In short, The Chief Justice's view of the State's
compelling interest in maternal health has less to do with health
than it does with compelling women to be maternal.

 Nor does The Chief Justice give any serious consideration
to the doctrine of stare decisis.  For The Chief Justice, the
facts that gave rise to Roe are surprisingly simple:  women
become pregnant, there is a point somewhere, depending on medical
technology, where a fetus becomes viable, and women give birth to
children.  Ante, at 13. This characterization of the issue thus
allows The Chief Justice quickly to discard the joint opinion's
reliance argument by asserting that reproductive planning could
take . . . virtually immediate accout of a decision overruling
Roe.  Id., at 14 (internal quotations omitted).